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On August 24, 1991 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ceased to exist 
when Mikhail Gorbachev announced his resignation as party leader. His decision was 
dramatic. He ordered the nationalization of communist party property, dissolved the 
CPSU Central Committee, and banned party cells in the Soviet Armed Forces, the KGB 
and the militia. The party died a quick death.
Yet seventy years of communist rule had shaped the thinking and behavior of Soviet 
citizens. Trends in Soviet political elite mobility had promoted patronage tracts, alliance 
building, and access to privileges which put communist party members above the 
average citizen. Certain regions produced successive generations of party officials—
Dnepropetrovsk, Kemerovo and Sverdlovsk, to name a few of the most famous. A few 
months or even years will not erase this behavior. How might former communists be 
expected to conduct themselves after the Soviet collapse? Did their employment 
patterns change before the Soviet Union's demise? Did these changes assist their 
transition to the post-Soviet order? To what degree will former communists be able to 
prosper in the new political and economic environment in Russia and the other former 
Soviet republics?
Party Officials and Retirement
Even before the Soviet collapse, communist party officials found new employment 
opportunities after dismissal from the party organs. Unlike under Stalin, when forced 
retirement meant banishment to a remote outpost or even death, Gorbachev-era 
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politicians still enjoyed a political future after leaving the CPSU apparatus. Former 
Politburo member and CPSU Secretary Lev Zaikov, for instance, influenced Soviet arms 
control decision making after his retirement in July 1990. Zaikov chaired what was 
known as the "Arms Control Group," which became the "Group on Negotiations." This 
body functioned first under the Politburo and then under the USSR presidency. Zaikov's 
group decided tricky questions related to arms control and the defense industry that 
were then sent to Gorbachev for signature.
Other former Politburo and Secretariat members also found advisory roles outside the 
party apparatus. Former CPSU Secretary Viktor Chebrikov advised then KGB Chairman 
Viktor Kryuchkov during the USSR Supreme Soviet debate on the Law on the KGB. 
Both men were seen throughout the debate arriving, sitting, and leaving together. 
Former CPSU Central Committee (CC) chiefs also held consultancy positions after their 
retirement. The former chief (1955-1986) of the CPSU CC International Department, 
Boris Ponomarev, occupied an office within the CPSU CC headquarters up until the 
August 1991 coup.(1)
Other party officials found the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's 
Deputies to be a new arena to continue their political careers after retirement from the 
party organs. Former Politburo members Vitali Vorotnikov and Nikolai Ryzhkov tried to 
influence voting during parliamentary sessions. Even after the coup attempt, former 
CPSU officials attempted to dominate the state machinery. A list of candidates for the 
Soviet of the Union's International Affairs Commission was full of former CPSU officials, 
notably including CPSU Secretary A. Dzasokhov, former Azerbaijani Communist Party 
First Secretary A. R. Vezirov, and former First Deputy Chief of the CPSU CC Social-
Political Department V. I. Mironenko. They failed in their quest, however, when the 
central organs were abolished with the formation of the Commonwealth in December 
1991.
In March 1992 Ryzhkov led a group of officials who attempted to reconvene the USSR 
Congress of Peoples Deputies and called for the recreation of central leadership 
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organs. The Russian government had to combat these forces and promptly rejected 
their proposal. In the post-Soviet period former communist officials who wish to return to 
a strong center may prove to be a force with which Yel'tsin will have to combat. They 
seem to have survived the transition from communist party officials to average citizens 
attempting to influence Russian politics.
Party Officials and their Business Ventures
As early as 1987 party officials prepared for upheaval in the Soviet system when they 
established special accounts and businesses to protect party property. Numerous 
buildings, including hospitals, military facilities, research institutes, schools, etc., 
belonged to the party. In August 1990, for instance, CPSU Deputy General Secretary 
Vladimir Ivashko signed a memorandum which called for using CPSU assets to create 
an "invisible party economy" in the form of private banks and businesses to fund this 
takeover.(2) With the CPSU's demise, former communist officials focused on purchasing 
this real estate quickly.
Indeed, some party officials prospered after the Soviet collapse. These bureaucrats, 
who were well-educated professionals, were expected to become effective 
administrators in a new political and economic system. The former Soviet Minister of 
Aviation Industry, Apollon Systsov, tried to convert his ministry into a corporation to sell 
aircraft technology and parts. Between fifteen and twenty former Soviet ministers, all 
former party officials, have entered the business world. Polad A. Polad-Zade founded 
Vodstroi from a portion of the former USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water. 
The private company had 400,000 employees and revenues of about $18 million. Its 
main task was to build reservoirs, dams, apartments and roads.(3)
At the same time many former communist officials tried to take control of property 
through behind-the-scenes deals. Former CPSU CC Defense Department Chief Oleg 
Belyakov, former Gosteleradio chief Leonid Kravchenko, other former CPSU CC officials 
and their wives attempted to form a joint-stock company, Kolo, worth R1 billion. Kolo's 
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holdings would have included the Energiya aerospace complex and other property such 
as the military airfield Vnukovo-3 near Moscow. Some high-ranking government officials 
sympathized and assisted in this deal. Significantly, several members of the Yel'tsin 
government had to resign because of their connections with the company's founders.
Former Communist Behavior in the Soviet Successor States
Former communist party officials continued to play a role in the Soviet successor states. 
Party apparatchiks found themselves well suited for the new environment since they 
were the best organized forces with access to loyal personnel and financial assets to 
support their drives to maintain their power bases.
Russian President Boris Yel'tsin, despite his renunciation of communist ideology, still 
behaved like a communist politician. For example, he relied on patronage tracts and 
alliance building from his home base of Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk). Yuri 
Petrov, Gennadi Burbulis, Oleg Lobov, and several other top Russian officials followed 
Yel'tsin from Sverdlovsk where they had served him as loyal party apparatchiks. Yet 
these officials did not all unite behind Yel'tsin following the putsch. Some, such as 
Burbulis—who were young, highly educated individuals with all the privileges of the old 
communist elite—dedicated themselves to Yel'tsin's cause. Others, such as Petrov, 
were from an older generation and sought less radical reform efforts. Moreover, Yel'tsin 
sometimes exhibited an authoritarian style which could be linked to his communist 
upbringing. His moves towards government control of the press and the creation of a 
superministry for security illustrated his desire for a strong hand when events slipped 
from his control.
The Russian President's reliance on his immediate staff caused setbacks in Russia's 
reform program as politicians struggled over the placement of former CPSU staff. For 
instance, Petrov's control over the staffing positions within the Russian government led 
to an influx of former Central Committee officials. G. Orlov, an assistant to former CPSU 
CC General Department Chief Valeri Boldin, made a lateral move by becoming first 
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deputy chief of the General Department within the Russian Council of Ministers. Oleg 
Lobov, head of a "Council of Experts" within the Russian government, also had 
personnel and staffing responsibilities. According to Russian sources, he supervised the 
hiring of several unidentified MIC and former CPSU officials into the Yel'tsin 
government. Importantly, these officials blocked important reform efforts led by Yel'tsin's 
economic affairs tsar, Yegor Gaidar.
Within the Russian Federation, former high-ranking communist officials resisted diktat 
from Moscow after the Soviet Union's collapse and fought hard to protect their 
privileges. Many former regional party bosses, who had been forced to give up the post 
of chairman of the regional Soviet and first party secretary, opposed Yel'tsin, and many 
were successful, remaining influential in local administration. For example, in January 
1992 the Russian president's trip to Bryansk revealed that former local party officials 
regularly ignored the Kremlin's commands by retaining huge staffs and their own food 
supplies.
Within the other Soviet successor states, former communist party officials found new life 
in several ways. Primarily, they simply renamed the parties to which they belonged. The 
Ukrainian Communist Party was reorganized to become the Party of Social Progress of 
Ukraine; the Tajikistan Communist Party changed its name to the People's Democratic 
Party; and the Uzbekistan Communist Party became the People's Democratic Party. In 
some instances, this "renaming" process removed some party apparatchiks while others 
prospered. For example, within Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, vestiges of the former 
communist parties stalled the emergence of full-fledged democracy as clans struggled 
to protect their privileges. Indeed, the Soviet collapse reversed eight years of attempts 
to bring the outlying republics into line with Moscow. Several prominent victims of 
Andropov's and Gorbachev's anti-corruption campaigns quickly returned to power, 
including former Politburo member and Azerbaijani First Secretary Geider Aliev and 
former Tajik Communist Party First Secretary Rakhman Nabiev. They relied on 
nationalist appeal and promises of better living conditions which prevailed before 1985.
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Conclusion
Overall, despite the collapse of Soviet Union, a sizable proportion of communists 
survived on various levels with their authority intact. Some prospered financially, while 
others continued to employ political methods to strengthen their positions and weaken 
their enemies. Although ideology had vanished as a motivating factor, former communist 
officials dominated the struggle for power in the post-Soviet era. These actors included 
former Central Committee members, former Soviet government officials, and obkom, 
raikom, and local secretaries. Their potential influence was great, given the fact that 
they continued to be managers over property, funds, and personnel. Thus, a turbulent 
and uncertain future lies ahead as former CPSU officials attempt to protect their 
privileges and personal security in the Soviet successor states.
Notes:
1Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 30, 1991.
2Komsomol'skaya Pravda, October 1, 1991 and TSN, October 31, 1991.
3The New York Times Magazine, January 26, 1992.
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